As questões que norteiam esta reflexão se colocam no entrecruzamento da Arte com a Educação bem como na inserção destas no mercado influenciado pelo poder midiático. A intervenção do educador apresenta-se como mediação que irá se contrapor à velocidade técnica imposta e buscar na interação logos/pathos a experiência do olhar pensante sobre a obra de arte.

Num mundo onde tudo se tornou imagem, parece da maior importância investigar filosoficamente as conexões entre imagens e educação. As imagens-marketing, compondo desejos capturados por um capitalismo que já traz prontos os mundos e seus sentidos, assumiram o status de arte e impregnam tudo - os sentidos, os raciocínios, a imaginação… elas educam. Ora, se é mesmo assim, interessa investigar as relações possíveis entre filosofia e imagem e educação. É o que propõe este dossiê.

O estudo investigou a experiência de transição para a aposentadoria na perspectiva subjetiva dos sujeitos que a vivenciaram. Foram entrevistados 20 trabalhadores aposentados no período de até 18 meses após o desligamento de suas atividades laborais. As entrevistas seguiram roteiro semi-estruturado e..

Este estudo teve por objetivo conhecer as percepções de psicoterapeutas e pacientes em psicoterapia psicanalítica acerca das características essenciais ao exercício da psicoterapia. Participaram da pesquisa cinco profissionais da área e cinco pacientes em tratamento nesta mesma abordagem teórica. O ..

Este artigo apresenta reflexões sobre o letramento literário a partir da recepção da obra O olho de vidro do meu avô, de Bartolomeu Campos de Queirós, por meio da análise de depoimentos de leitores comuns – a literatura no cotidiano dos indivíduos - e de trechos de artigos científicos sobre a obra – a literatura no campo acadêmico. Apresentamos também uma sequência didática desenvolvida com alunos do 6º ano do Ensino Fundamental de uma escola pública de Itabirito, interior de Minas (...) Gerais, a partir da recepção do livro. Para a realização da prática pedagógica, usamos a proposta sugerida e experienciada por Rildo Cosson para o letramento literário, denominada pelo pesquisador como “Sequência Básica”, composta por quatro etapas: motivação, introdução, leitura e interpretação. Dessa forma, procuramos compreender a literatura, a leitura literária e o letramento literário na vida social e na escola, pois cabe a essa instituição proporcionar aos alunos experiências que desenvolvam essa competência para o letramento literário, a se perpetuar pela vida adulta. O principal objetivo desse processo no contexto escolar é formar um leitor que aprecie significações estéticas, capaz de se inserir em uma comunidade que faça suas próprias escolhas literárias, que saiba manipular seus instrumentos culturais e possa construir com eles um sentido para si e para o mundo em que vive. Dessa forma, é necessário reconhecer a importância de atividades que abarquem diferentes tipos de materiais escritos, mas que não sejam negligenciados os textos literários, multiplicando, dessa forma, os espaços de leitura e constituindo comunidades de leitores na escola e fora dela. (shrink)

Friends as well as foes of Kant have long been uneasy over his emphasis on duty, but lately the view that there is something morally repugnant about acting from duty seems to be gaining in popularity. More and more philosophers indicate their readiness to jettison duty and the moral 'ought' and to conceive of the perfectly moral person as someone who has all the right desires and acts accordingly without any notion that (s)he ought to act in this way. Elsewhere' (...) I have argued that such a picture of the perfectly moral person is flawed. In this paper I examine the claim that acting from duty is morally repugnant. There is some truth to this charge, but, I argue, the repugnance attaches not to acting from duty as such, but only to certain ways of acting from duty. In isolating the objectionable elements of acting from duty, I hope not only to vindicate the skeletal concept but also to offer illumination on the question of just how we should understand morally good conduct. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that the top three Model Penal Code culpability levels suffice for criminal liability, but the fourth is controversial. And it isn’t just the particular MPC wording; that negligence should be on the list at all is controversial. My question is: What makes negligence so different? What is it about negligence that gives rise to the view that it should not suffice for criminal liability? In addressing it, I draw attention to how we conduct the debate, and (...) how our framing of the issues is shaping it. My hope is to prompt thought and discussion on just what we want the element of mens rea to provide, and to draw attention to background assumptions that shape our views of what it should take for negligence to count as a species of mens rea. (shrink)

Justifications and excuses are defenses that exculpate. They are therefore much more like each other than like such defenses as diplomatic immunity, which does not exculpate. But they exculpate in different ways, and it has proven difficult to agree on just what that difference consists in. In this paper I take a step back from justification and excuse as concepts in criminal law, and look at the concepts as they arise in everyday life. To keep the task manageable, I focus (...) primarily on excuses and excusing activities, distinguishing them from justifications as well as from other close relatives, in particular, forgiving and pardoning. I draw upon J.L. Austin’s classic A Plea for Excuses, but expand on his account, suggesting that we offer excuses for reasons besides those he mentions. My hope is that my examination of excuses and excusing activities will help us rethink our views on just how justifications and excuses differ, views which often are worked out without much attention to how these concepts function in everyday life and to the connection between offers of excuses and justifications and the rules of civility. (shrink)

American doctors in the 1990s are being asked to serve as "double agents," weighing competing allegiances to patients' medical needs against the monetary costs to society. This situation is a reaction to rapid cost increases for medical services, themselves the result of the haphazard development since the 1920s of an inherently inflationary, open-ended system for funding and delivering health care. The answer to an inefficient system, however, is not to stint on care, but rather to restructure the system to remove (...) the inflationary pressures. As long as we are spending enormous resources on an inherently inefficient and inflationary system we cannot justify asking doctors to withhold beneficial care to save money for third-party payers. Doing so serves a largely political agenda and endangers the patient-centered ethic that is central to medicine. (shrink)

This article presents a Kantian alternative to the mainstream approach in ethics concerning the phenomena that are widely thought to require a category of the supererogatory. My view is that the phenomena do not require this category of imperfect duties. Elsewhere I have written on Kant on this topic; here I shift my focus away from interpretive issues and consider the pros and cons of the Kantian approach. What background assumptions would lean one to favour the Kantian approach and what (...) sorts would lean one to favour the mainstream approach? I also consider the possibility that in institutional contexts, there is a need for the category of the supererogatory. Here, it seems, we do need to know what we really have to do and what is beyond the call of duty; in this context, however, duty is not the Kantian moral notion, but rather is pegged to particular roles, or to the needs of the institution or group or club of which one is a member. But even here, I argue, the notion of the supererogatory is not crucial. (shrink)

What is the relation between shame and shamelessness? It may seem obvious: shamelessness is simply the absence of shame. But on reflection, it becomes clear that the story is considerably more complicated. Michelle Mason's intriguing "On Shamelessness" prompts such reflection. Mason argues that we should be mindful of the "moral importance of shame" and "unapologetic in its defense", and she does so via an examination of shamelessness and an argument to the effect that shamelessness is a moral fault. The tacit (...) assumption is that insofar as shamelessness is a moral fault, the value of shame is vindicated. I challenge that assumption. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Obligatory Ends Anti‐paternalism and the Duty of Beneficence Beneficence: The Finer Points The Question of Latitude Latitude and (Im)partiality Gratitude Sympathy Conclusion Bibliography.

About 2 million minor children in the U.S. have at least one parent incarcerated for criminal offenses. There are about 33,000 undocumented persons detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in jails and federal detention centers around the country, and 79% of the minor children of these detainees are U.S. citizens. There are few government programs that measure and respond to the harm caused to these children by the incarceration and detention of their parents, and the negative effects on these children (...) are largely ignored in public policy debates about incarceration and immigration detention. I argue that we have an obligation to these children based on the special status of children, the harm caused to children by the arrest, detention and incarceration of their parents, current incarceration and detention policies even in the presence of alternatives that would, on balance, create less harm. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:25 MORALITY AS A BACK-UP SYSTEM: HUME'S VIEW? The sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty..... Nowell-Smith A certain picture of morality — arguably a Humean one — has come to have a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. On this picture, morality, as Richard Brandt asserts, is "a back-up system, which operates (...) when spontaneous personal caring fails 2 to motivate us to do as we ought." Morality — at least in the form of moral principles, whose force is felt through one's sense of duty — is, on this view, ideally superfluous. As a guide for one's own conduct it is needed only insofar as the agent's affective network is deficient. If one only spontaneously desired a, cared about b, cared for c, felt aversion towards d as, ideally, one should, moral principles and a sense of duty would be of no use. There are good reasons for supposing that this is Hume's view. After all, his characterization of acting from duty is more than a little disparaging: When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself,,as much as possible, his want of it. I will argue, however, that there is tension in Hume's ethics between two lines of thought. According to the first line of thought, and the one 26 usually associated with Hume, good conduct is conduct which is spontaneously prompted by virtuous desires. Unless our desires either are not what they should be or are motivationally weak, there is no need for mediation or tempering by a sense of duty or moral principles. According to the second line, the very good desires of a very good person may nonetheless need to be filtered, tempered, redirected or checked. This line is most evident in "Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues and Vices." Before arguing that these strains of thought are in tension in Hume's ethics, I need to clarify what is at issue and to develop the two competing pictures of moral motivation. First the issue. The issue is not 'Who is better: someone with a sense of duty but corrupt desires or someone with no sense of duty but ideal desires?' Nor is the issue one of the moral worth of actions ('Can an action have moral worth if it is not performed out of duty?') The issue, rather, is how to characterize morally good (or right) conduct. What role, if any, does a sense of duty or a Butlerian principle of reflection, i.e., an overarching, guiding conception of what is right or good which is 'juridically' supreme within the self, play in good conduct? Is morally good conduct ideally a matter of acting as one should from the proper desires? Or should the desires be governed and guided by moral principles? Consider two models of moral conduct. Model I: Morality as a Back-Up System On this picture, wrongness in conduct is traceable to an affective deficiency. The claim underlying this picture seems to be as follows: One 27 acts wrongly because one's passions are not quite what they should be. One person cheats in her business dealings because she cares too little about the welfare of others (and too much about her own); another is harsh and abrupt to a student because he cares too little about his students' concerns and is jealous and possessive when it comes to 'his time.' In each case the problem can be traced to an affective deficiency. Hume appears to be supporting this view when he asserts, "it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no act can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from a sense of its morality' (T 479). A few pages later he writes, "[E]very immorality... (shrink)

Este livro inclui as palestras apresentadas no XIII Congresso Internacional de Estética, ocorrido em Belo Horizonte em outubro de 2017, cujo título, “Os fins da arte”, explora o duplo sentido do termo “fim” que, polissêmico, indica término, conclusão e epílogo, assim como o propósito, a meta, o objetivo, a motivação, e ainda o limite e a decadência. O uso plural desse termo amplifica, ainda, suas possibilidades de interpretação. Os textos deste livro mostram de modo evidente o quanto a questão do (...) “fim” contribui de maneira estratégica para pensar a arte durante o último século e o início deste. O livro conta com textos dos filósofos e filósofas da arte Márcia Ferreira Gonçalves, Gunter Gebauer, Rosa Gabriella Gonçalves, Giorgia Cecchinato, Alessandro Bertinetto, Cliff Hill Kormann, Rodrigo Duarte, Rita Velloso e do filósofo francês David Lapoujade, um dos principais nomes da filosofia na atualidade. (shrink)

Part I raises some questions concerning the extent of our freedom on the view that Henry Allison's Kant's Theory of Freedom attributes to Kant, and the possibility, on that view, of weakness of will. Allison is correct to attribute to Kant the "Incorporation Thesis": one is never compelled to do x just because one has a desire (even a very intense desire) to do x; a desire moves one to action only if one allows it to. But while the attribution (...) seems correct, there is a puzzle: how, given the Incorporation Thesis, is weakness of will, or "frailty", possible? Part II considers Kant's claim in The Doctrine of Virtue that we have an indirect duty to cultivate our sympathetic feelings. Allison's interpretation is unsatisfactory because it fails to steer clear of the "impurity" problem: the interpretation seems to foist on Kant an endorsement of impurity, i.e. the seeking out of nonmoral reasons to induce one to do one's duty. To seek out such reasons is to cultivate an impure will, something Kant warns against. A different interpretation is offered. (shrink)

The doctrine of double effect has a firm, respected position within Roman Catholic medical ethics. In addition, public debate often incorporates this doctrine when determining the acceptability of certain actions. This essay examines and assesses the application of this doctrine to end-of-life decisions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.1 (Spring 2011): 99–119.

Hume scholars have been anxious to point out that when Hume calls Justice, chastity and so on artificial virtues, he is in no way denying that they are real virtues. I shall argue that they are mistaken, and that anyone who wants to understand Hume's account of Justice and his category of artificial virtues must take seriously his choice of the word ‘artifice,’ recognizing that it means not only ‘Skill in designing and employing expedients,’ but also ‘address, cunning, trickery.'My suggestion (...) will seem strange given Hume's own repeated plea that we not take the term ‘artifice’ too seriously. Yet while it is generally good policy to take people - at least philosophers - at their word, this is a Justified exception, Justified not only by Hume's known proclivities to irony and subtlety, but also by the implications of hearkening to his plea. To see the implications of not taking the terms ‘artificial’ and ‘artifice’ seriously, one can read either Duncan Forbes’ or Barry Stroud's criticisms of Hume's account of Justice. (shrink)

Moral responsibility is a prerequisite for culpability. One can be morally responsible for φing without being culpable for it, but not vice versa. I agree with Andrew Simester on this, and agree that it is important to differentiate moral responsibility from culpability. That moral responsibility is a prerequisite for culpability is often taken to require sharply distinguishing excuses from what are called ‘exemptions’ (or to use the term Simester uses, ‘irresponsibility defences’) and treating exemptions as forming a category of their (...) own. I am not convinced that it does. In previous work, I have gone against the prevailing view by understanding the category of excuses to include what, on that view, are classified as exemptions. In this paper I reconsider this, delving deeper into the matter than I have in the past and drawing on Simester’s magisterial Fundamentals of Criminal Law to do so. I challenge the position that exemptions form a category of their own, distinct from excuses, and that infancy and insanity need to be understood as exemptions and not excuses. I argue that the category of exemptions, or “irresponsibility defenses,” is problematic, and that recognizing the distinction between culpability and moral responsibility and recognizing its importance does not commit one to excluding from the category of excuses infancy and insanity. Infancy and insanity are better seen as operating to exempt the agent altogether from moral responsibility only at the limit; more often, they operate to excuse, partially or fully. (shrink)

In this article I will discuss the dancer’s physical potential and the sensitive knowledge (‘la connaissance sensible’) that emerges from dance practice. For this, I take Lévi-Strauss’ (2010) theory of the ‘savage mind’ as a reference. This theory is important to understand how the discipline of dance does not need to be justified through modern science (Lévi-Strauss 2010). It is understood that dance operates from sensitive knowledge, while modern science is expressed through the intelligible. I will point out how the (...) dancer operates the sensitive, or dancing, thought, stressing that this type of knowledge is created through interest in how to use it and not through interest in how it serves, or what it means. I will then explain how, through sensitive knowledge, dancers propose new challenges during their aesthetic training in order to develop new body technologies, thereby increasing their expressive potential. For this, dancers need to develop body acuity. In other words, I will discuss the processes that dancers use to transform the perception of the self and of the world through danced gestures. In this process, the dancer is always looking for new challenges; he/she constantly deals with new risks in order to discover new knowledge. I will also discuss the problem that dance faces in traditional academia, which disregards sensitive knowledge and values scientific knowledge. (shrink)

In “Is Penalty Enhancement a Sound Idea?” Claudia Card calls into question hate crime legislation, querying whether hatred makes a crime worse, whether hatred of the sort pertinent to hate crimes is worse than a more personal hatred, and whether the message sent by hate crime legislation is the intended message. This essay questions her assumption that penalty enhancement for hate crimes is warranted only if the crimes are worse than otherwise similar crimes that do not count as hate crimes. (...) Instead, it may be the case that it is the proper business of the state to take a particular interest in such crimes, in part because they enact not just any hatred but civic hatred. And if hate crimes are understood as enacting civic hatred, hate crime legislation can indeed serve to counter a message that very much needs to be countered. (shrink)

This chapter describes Card's characterization as an idealization that captures why hate crime legislation seems (at least prima facie) to be a very good idea. The rationale for enhanced penalties is far more compelling if hate crimes are characterized as Card characterizes them. She focuses on hate crimes that are motivated by hatred. Hate crimes today should be viewed as part of an ongoing campaign of intimidation. Card is of course well aware of the position that the legal category of (...) hate crimes and enhanced penalties for hate crimes are called for to counter the message sent by hate crimes; in fact she notes that she was initially "attracted to the idea of penalty enhancement legislation for hate crimes as a way to send a strong social message against racism, sexism, anti‐Semitism, and homophobia". (shrink)